Leveling the Playing Field: Financial Regulation and Disappearing Local Bias of Institutional Investors by BERNILE, Gennaro et al.
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of
Business Lee Kong Chian School of Business
10-2014
Leveling the Playing Field: Financial Regulation
and Disappearing Local Bias of Institutional
Investors
Gennaro BERNILE
Singapore Management University, gbernile@smu.edu.sg
Alok Kumar
University of Miami
Johan Sulaeman
Southern Methodist University
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research
Part of the Business Commons
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Lee Kong Chian School of Business at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore
Management University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business by an authorized administrator
of Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
BERNILE, Gennaro; Kumar, Alok; and Sulaeman, Johan. Leveling the Playing Field: Financial Regulation and Disappearing Local
Bias of Institutional Investors. (2014). Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/4525
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1808123 
Leveling the Playing Field:
Disclosure Regulation and Local Informational Advantage∗
Gennaro Bernile, Singapore Management University
Alok Kumar, University of Miami
Johan Sulaeman, National University of Singapore
March 16, 2015
Abstract – This study examines how changes in firms’ information environment affect local
agents. We show that local bias and informational advantage of institutional investors and equity
analysts located around corporate headquarters decline sharply following the adoption of Regu-
lation Fair Disclosure and Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The decline in local bias is more salient among
firms whose information environment is more opaque before the new rules. At the aggregate
market level, the degree of informed trading attributed to local investors also declines. Overall,
the evidence is consistent with disclosure regulation affecting the informational advantage that
market participants enjoy due to their proximity to firms.
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1. Introduction
Existing studies show that geographic proximity affects the behavior and performance of local
capital market participants. Coval and Moskowitz (1999, 2001) find that U.S. institutional in-
vestors hold a disproportionate fraction of the equity of firms headquartered locally and earn
higher returns on these local investments.1 In a similar vein, Malloy (2005) finds that analysts
located near firm headquarters have an informational advantage. Local capital market partic-
ipants may have personal contacts with the firm management, directly inspect local firms, or
acquire information about local firms’ operations. They may also have access to information
from other local sources (e.g., customers, suppliers, social networks, and news media) at a lower
cost. The information advantage of local agents, however, should depend on the firms’ infor-
mation environment. In particular, a less competitive and transparent information environment
provides more opportunities for local agents to obtain and exploit valuable information.
Disclosure regulation is a fundamental determinant of the quality and competitiveness of
firms’ information environment. In this study, we examine whether changes in U.S. disclosure
rules around the turn of the millennium affect the behavior and performance of local capital
market participants. Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX),
in particular, generate large exogenous shocks to the information environment of U.S. publicly-
traded firms. The new rules aim at curbing selective access to corporate information and improv-
ing the reliability of corporate financial reports. If the local bias and superior local performance
of capital market participants depend on firms’ information environment, we expect that both
would decline following the enactment of rules that aim to improve the competitiveness and
quality of the environment.2
In the first part of our analysis, we examine the quarterly portfolio holdings of 13(f) insti-
tutions during the 1996 to 2008 period. Consistent with our conjecture that the local bias of
institutional investors would decline in the more competitive information environment of the
new regulatory regime, there is a discrete 50% drop in the excess local holdings of institutional
1This evidence extends prior studies conducted in international settings, e.g., Tesar and Werner (1995).
2Reg FD aimed to “level the playing field” among different types of investors by curbing firms’ practice of
allowing access to corporate information to selected market participants ahead of its public disclosure. The new
rules mandated the disclosure of all material information to all investors at the same time. SOX mandated
the implementation of new rules for financial reporting aiming to improve its transparency, reliability, and
accountability. In particular, SOX addressed issues such as enhanced internal controls over financial reporting,
auditor independence, and corporate governance (Coates (2007)).
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investors around the enactment of the new rules. The average excess local institutional owner-
ship is stable at around 8% in the pre-regulation years (1996-1999). Then, it drops sharply and
stabilizes at around 4% in the new regulatory regime.
Next, to assess the effect of the new rules on investors’ incentives to focus on local firms, we
examine whether the relation between firms’ information environment and investors’ local bias
varies with the disclosure regulation regime. We find that while a firm’s excess local ownership
decreases with the quality of its information environment prior to the new rules, this relation
becomes significantly weaker in the new regime. This is consistent with the notion that the new
disclosure rules curb local investors’ informational advantage.
To more directly establish that the causal direction is from firm-level information environ-
ment to local institutional ownership in the old regime, we estimate a series of difference-in-
difference regressions. In particular, we hypothesize that the impact of the new rules on local
institutional ownership is larger for firms that operated in less transparent and less competitive
information environments prior to the regulatory changes. Consistent with this prediction, we
find that the firm-level declines in local ownership following the regulatory changes are more
pronounced among firms with large discretionary accruals, no major auditor, high skewness,
and no analyst coverage prior to the new rules.
To complement the investor bias analysis, we also investigate whether the ability of insti-
tutional investors to earn abnormal returns from local investments changes around the new
rules. A corollary of our argument is that local investors’ abnormal performance would decline
in the post-regulation environment. The empirical evidence is consistent with this prediction.
While institutional investors earn higher returns in local stocks relative to non-local stocks in
the pre-regulation period, they appear to have no such local informational advantage in the
post-regulation period.
In the second part of the paper, we shift our focus to sell-side equity analysts located around
corporate headquarters. As recognized by the SEC in the final ruling adopting Reg FD (Re-
lease No. 33-7881), these analysts were the most likely beneficiaries of selective access to firm
management. Consistent with this view, Malloy (2005) documents that analysts have relatively
superior information about local firms using a sample that largely consists of pre-Reg FD years.
Given the curtailing of selective access to corporate information in the new regulatory regime,
we expect the time-series patterns of geographic variation in analyst coverage and performance
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around the new rules to resemble the patterns observed for institutional investors.
Consistent with this conjecture, we document significant secular shifts in local analysts’
behavior and performance. First, similar to local institutional investors, we find that there is a
significant decline in the local coverage bias of sell-side equity analysts following the new rules.
The excess coverage of U.S. firms by local equity analysts declines by approximately 40% in the
new regulatory regime. Second, a concomitant decrease of local analysts’ information advantage
accompanies the reduction in the local analyst bias. Although local analysts display significantly
higher forecast accuracy prior to the new rules, such informational advantage is greatly reduced
– and in fact disappears – in the new regulatory regime.
Overall, our results support the notion that the quality and competitiveness of firms’ infor-
mation environments affect local capital market participants’ behavior and performance. Prior
to Reg FD and SOX, agents focus on local stocks for which they are likely to enjoy a competitive
advantage in gathering and processing information. Following the new rules aimed at leveling
the information playing field, the informational advantage of local agents disappears and their
bias toward local firms is greatly reduced.3
In the last part of the paper, we examine the implications of our main findings for aggregate
capital market outcomes. In particular, we test whether the enactment of the new rules changes
the relation between market-wide measures of informed trading and institutional investors’ lo-
cal bias. If investors as a group recognize the increased quality and competitiveness of the
information environment, we expect that the relation between market-wide measures of adverse
selection and excess local ownership would be weaker in the new regulatory regime.
To conduct our tests, we use two different market-based measures of informed trading. First,
using the probability of informed trading (PIN) decomposition proposed in Duarte and Young
(2009), we find a strong positive relation between the adverse selection component of PIN (i.e.,
adjusted PIN) and local investor bias prior to the new rules. This relation, however, becomes
weaker following the regulatory changes. By contrast, the relation between local bias and the
3The documented patterns in investor and analyst local bias seem inconsistent with alternative explanations
that rely on secular time-series patterns in technological advancement. In particular, such technology-induced
secular trends (e.g., cheaper access to the Internet in the mid-90’s, launch of the SEC’s EDGAR system in 1996)
would have started earlier and continued in the later part of our sample period. Similarly, it is hard to explain
why a trend in analyst and investor preferences would suddenly stop and coincide with the regulatory changes.
Relatedly, we show that our findings do not reflect the changing preferences of institutional investors during the
rise and fall of the technology sector around the year 2000.
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liquidity component of PIN (i.e., the estimated probability of symmetric order flow shocks)
remains strongly positive and significant throughout our sample period. This evidence suggests
that, while their role as liquidity providers (see Shive (2012)) is not affected, local investors’
ability to engage in information-based trading decreases after the new rules.
Second, because the PIN-decomposition data only span a short period following the new
rules, we conduct similar tests using effective trading spreads instead, which prior studies sug-
gest are directly related to the adverse selection component of stock prices (e.g., Eleswarapu,
Thompson, and Venkataraman (2004)). We find that there is a strong positive relation between
local bias and subsequent trading spreads prior to the new rules, again consistent with a local
informational advantage. However, the local bias-spread relation becomes significantly weaker
in the new regulation regime. Moreover, this decline is most pronounced outside of earnings
announcement windows, when access to local information would be most valuable.
In our last set of tests, we extend the spread-based analysis by zooming in on earnings an-
nouncements to identify whether selective access to private information or superior processing of
public information drives the local informational advantage prior to the new rules. If the local ad-
vantage prior to the new rules stems from selective access, we expect that the pre-announcement
local bias-spreads relation would be most affected in the new regime. Alternatively, we expect
that the post-announcement local bias-spreads relation would be most affected if the local ad-
vantage prior to the new rules stems from superior processing. We find that, prior to the new
rules, the local bias-spreads relation is positive and similar in magnitude during earnings pre-
and post-announcement windows. In the new regime, however, the pre-announcement local
bias-spreads relation becomes significantly weaker, whereas the post-announcement relation is
virtually unaffected. This evidence suggests that the new rules at the turn of the millennium
may have affected local agents’ behavior and performance mostly through the curtailment of
selective access to corporate information.
Collectively, our findings make significant contributions to both the local bias and the regu-
lation literatures. Our evidence indicates that rules governing firm disclosures have a first-order
impact on the behavior of local market participants (investors and sell-side analysts), and conse-
quently market prices. Further, the sharp decline in the informational advantage of local agents
suggests that the new rules effectively changed the competitive landscape of the information
acquisition process, consistent with their stated intent.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we briefly review the related
literature and institutional background that motivate our testable hypotheses. In Section 3, we
describe our sample and data. We present our empirical findings in Sections 4 (local institutional
investors), 5 (local analysts), and 6 (aggregate market effects). We conclude in Section 7.
2. Related Literature and Testable Hypotheses
2.1. Financial Regulation and the Information Environment
Many public companies regularly hold conference calls when their quarterly earnings reports
are released to communicate issues that are not covered in those reports. Until the late 1990s,
these conference calls were typically restricted to equity analysts and investors with substantial
capital. Similarly, access to top-level executives was generally restricted to large market players
because, it was argued, providing the same level of access to all investors would be too costly.
With the technological advancements of the 1990s, this cost argument lost relevance. In
response, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) proposed Regulation Fair Dis-
closure (Reg FD) in December 1999. The new rules would prohibit publicly-traded companies
from selectively disclosing material non-public information to securities markets professionals
ahead of general public disclosures. The general principle advocated by the new rules was that
the disclosure of material information should be made to all investors at the same time. While
small investors supported the new rules, large investors argued that forcing managers to pro-
vide equal access to all investors would lead to less access to value-relevant information for all
investors (e.g., Weber (2000a, 2000b), Shiller (2000), SEC (2000), Hasset (2000), Bushee, Mat-
sumoto, and Miller (2004), Duarte, Han, Harford, and Young (2008)). Despite these concerns,
the SEC enacted Reg FD in October 2000.
The available empirical evidence on the consequences of Reg FD is somewhat mixed. Prior
studies find no significant changes in stock price volatility (e.g., Bailey, Li, Mao, and Zhong
(2003)), analysts’ forecast accuracy (e.g., Heflin, Subramanyam, and Zhang (2003)), and effective
trading spreads (Eleswarapu, Thompson, and Venkataraman (2004)), which suggests that Reg
FD did not adversely affect the overall market quality. Consistent with these findings, Bushee,
Matsumoto, and Miller (2004) conclude that Reg FD did not have a large adverse effect on
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the disclosure policies of firms that previously allowed selective access to conference calls and
that small investors benefited from the new rules. Duarte, Han, Harford, and Young (2008),
however, document that Reg FD is associated with a slight increase in the typical firm’s cost of
capital. This finding suggests that the benefits to small investors may have come at the expense
of reduced price efficiency.
Notwithstanding Reg FD’s effects on overall market efficiency, there seems to be a consensus
on the notion that the new rules affected firms’ disclosure practices. Relatedly, while the new
rules would affect all market participants, we expect their largest impact would be on those
investors who enjoyed selective access to value-relevant information in the pre-Reg FD environ-
ment. In particular, if geographic proximity to management facilitated such access, then the
new rules would reduce the competitive advantage of local capital market participants.
Not long after the passage of Reg FD, the public’s confidence in the U.S. financial market was
shaken by fraudulent accounting scandals at Enron, WorldCom, and several other companies.
These highly-publicized scandals exposed significant weaknesses in public companies’ financial
reporting practices and resulted in several new proposals aimed at curbing fraudulent accounting
(Holmstro¨m and Kaplan (2003), Coates (2007)). Most notably, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX)
was enacted in July 2002 with widespread approval by individual and professional investors
groups (Hochberg, Sapienza, and Vissing-Jorgensen (2009)). The proponents of the new rules
advocated them as necessary to restore the smooth functioning of capital markets. In particular,
SOX mandated new rules that would lead to enhanced financial disclosure, greater auditor
independence, and improved corporate governance with the intent to improve the transparency,
reliability, and accountability of firms’ financial reports (Coates (2007)).4
Although they reach different conclusions regarding its effects on overall efficiency, several
studies consistently provide evidence that SOX requirements affected firms’ reporting behavior
and were more beneficial to firms that operated in more opaque information environments prior
to the new rules (e.g., Zhang (2007), Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007), Li, Pincus, and Rego
4For example, Sections 101-109 created the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) to provide
for auditors’ oversight; Sections 302, 401-406, 408-409, and 906 mandated new disclosure rules pertaining to
internal control systems and officer certifications; Sections 201-209 and 303 further regulated public company
auditors and auditor-client relationship; Sections 301, 304, 306, and 407 introduced requirements for listed
companies pertaining to the composition of audit and control committees, and banned officer loans; Sections
802, 807, 902-905, 1102, 1104, and 1106 introduced criminal penalties for fraudulent misreporting; and Sections
806 and 1107 introduced new whistle-blower protections.
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(2008), and Iliev (2010)). Similar conclusions are supported by recent evidence in Bauguess,
Bernile, Lee, Marietta-Westberg, and Alexander (2013). They find that although compliance
costs remain a concern among smaller firms, corporate insiders’ views largely support the notion
that SOX rules improve the quality of financial reporting and control processes and, thus,
increase investor confidence in firm disclosures.
Even more than for Reg FD, the impact of SOX on overall efficiency is still debated (e.g.,
Cohen, Dey, and Lys (2008)). The available evidence, however, largely indicates that the en-
hanced financial disclosure resulting from the new rules increased the confidence of the investing
public, especially of relatively small uninformed investors. We expect that these improvements
would reduce the perceived costs of relying on firms’ financial reports and relatively more so
for uninformed investors. In turn, the perceived competitive advantage of investors located in
firms’ geographic proximity would be eroded as as result.
Overall, both Reg FD and SOX should lead to a more level playing field for relatively less
informed capital market participants by making the information environment more competitive
and transparent. These changes in the information environment would affect the behavior of
local market participants, if the latter were better able to exploit local information sources prior
to the new rules.
2.2. Financial Regulation and Local Market Participants
Anecdotal evidence suggests that proximity to firm management can yield informational advan-
tage to local agents. In fact, in its release of Reg FD, the SEC explicitly mentioned that firms
often disclose non-public information to both securities analysts and institutional investors.5
5Two subsequent SEC enforcement cases provide evidence of selective disclosure practices that may have
benefited local institutional investors. In November 2001, the SEC contested that the CEO of Siebel Systems,
a California-based technology company, disclosed nonpublic information to selected investors at an invitation-
only technology conference hosted by Goldman Sachs & Company in California. In response to questions from
a Goldman Sachs analyst, the CEO announced that he was optimistic about the firm since the business was
returning to normal. This announcement was opposite to the negative statements made by the CEO three
weeks earlier. Following the disclosure at the conference, attendees purchased Siebel’s stocks or communicated
the information to others who purchased Siebel’s shares. Following the conference, Siebel experienced a one-
day stock return of about 20% and trading volume twice as its daily average. Thus, investors who attended
the conference enjoyed a substantial informational advantage. In another relevant enforcement case, the SEC
contested in March 2002 that the CEO of Secure Computing (John McNulty) disclosed nonpublic information
about a significant contract to two portfolio managers in violation of the Reg FD. The SEC took exception to
the fact that Secure actively promoted its stock to institutional investors through in-person presentations, in
addition to a series of conference calls and email exchanges with selected investors. Source: Secure Computing
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Consistent with anecdotal evidence, previous research indicates that the local bias of institu-
tional investors is at least partly due to a local information advantage (e.g., Coval and Moskowitz
(1999, 2001), Baik, Kang, and Kim (2010)). Similarly, Malloy (2005) concludes that sell-side eq-
uity analysts have relatively better information about local firms. It is however an open question
whether disclosure rules affect the informational advantage of local capital market participants
such as institutional investors and equity analysts.
Local market participants may be able to extract greater benefits from local stocks with high
information asymmetry as a result of selective access to corporate information and/or because
proximity to firms reduces the costs of gathering and processing public information. Our main
objective is to test whether exogenous shocks to firms’ information environment influence the
ownership patterns of local institutional investors, the coverage patterns of local equity analysts,
and the informational advantage of these two groups of market participants. Our identification
strategy exploits the regulatory changes introduced by Reg FD and SOX as a source of exogenous
variation and focuses on the time-series properties of local institutional ownership and analyst
coverage, as well as of the performance of these local agents around the new rules.
We organize our empirical tests around three broad sets of hypotheses concerning the effect
of disclosure rules on (1) local ownership and coverage levels, (2) local information advantage,
and (3) the link between local agents’ behavior and aggregate market outcomes.
2.2.1 Impact on Local Institutional Ownership and Analyst Coverage
If market participants’ preference for local stocks (at least partially) reflects a local informational
advantage, then disclosure rules designed to level the information gathering and processing
playing field should affect the behavior of local investors and equity analysts. In particular, we
predict that:
H1-i: Following disclosure rules that make the information environment more com-
petitive and transparent, the excess ownership of local investors around corporate
headquarters would decrease.
H1-ii: Following disclosure rules that make the information environment more com-
petitive and transparent, the excess coverage of local equity analysts around corpo-
Corporation and John McNulty, Exchange Act Release No. 46895, 2002 WL 310948 (November 25, 2002).
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rate headquarters would decrease.
Moreover, if a local information advantage indeed drives local agents’ behavior, then (i) this
link should weaken following rules that make the information environment more transparent
and competitive for all firms, and (ii) the effect of the regulation should be most pronounced
among firms whose information environment is less transparent and competitive prior to the
new rules. Therefore, we posit that:
H2-i: Following disclosure rules that mandate increased competition and trans-
parency of the information environment, capital market participants’ preference for
local stocks would depend less on features of firms’ information environments.
H2-ii: The effect of disclosure rules on local capital market participants’ prefer-
ences would be largest for firms with less transparent and competitive information
environments prior to the new rules.
2.2.2 Impact on Local Informational Advantage
Our next set of hypotheses, pertains more directly to the effect of disclosure rules on the infor-
mational advantage of local agents. In particular, we examine the performance of local investor
portfolios conditional on the regulatory regime and posit that:
H3-i: Following disclosure rules that make the information environment more com-
petitive and transparent, the abnormal performance of institutional investors’ local
portfolios would decline.
Existing studies suggest that the forecasting behavior of sell-side equity analysts depends on
their likely access to firm management (e.g., Bailey, Li, Mao, and Zhong (2003), Gintschel and
Markov (2004), Agrawal, Chadha, and Chen (2006)). Therefore, similar to Malloy (2005), we
use forecast accuracy as a proxy for sell-side equity analysts’ performance. Similar to the logic
of hypothesis H3-i, we posit that:
H3-ii: Following disclosure rules that make the information environment more com-
petitive and transparent, the forecast accuracy of local equity analysts would decline.
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2.2.3 Impact on Market Outcomes
Our last set of hypotheses pertains to aggregate market participants’ perceptions of the likely in-
formational advantage of local agents. To conduct these tests, we examine the link between local
ownership and market-based measures of information asymmetry conditional on the regulatory
environment.
Specifically, first, we test whether the new rules affect the relation between excess local
holdings and two common microstructure measures of the adverse selection component of stock
prices – PIN and effective spread. We posit that:
H4: Following disclosure rules that make the information environment more com-
petitive and transparent, the link between institutional local bias and the adverse
selection component of stock prices would weaken.
Second, we attempt to distinguish between the selective access and superior information
processing channels. If the effects of the new rules mostly stem from the reduction in selective
access, the weakening of the local ownership-adverse selection relation in the new regulatory
regime should be mostly concentrated in periods preceding public disclosure events, such as
earnings announcements. Conversely, if the effects mostly stem from the increased transparency
of firm disclosures, the weakening of the local ownership-adverse selection relation should be
mostly concentrated in periods following public disclosure events. To summarize, we posit that:
H5: If the new rules mostly curb selective access to corporate information (increase
the transparency of firms’ disclosures), then the local ownership-adverse selection
relation would become relatively weaker during pre-disclosure (post-disclosure) win-
dows.
3. Data and Measures
3.1. Main Data Sources
Our core dataset includes all Compustat firms with available 10-K filings in the Electronic Data
Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval (EDGAR) system, with fiscal years ending between 1996 and
2008. There are 47,625 firm-year observations in our core dataset. Our second main dataset is
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the quarterly common stock holdings of 13(f) institutions compiled by Thomson Reuters. We
identify the institutional investor location (zip code) using the Nelson’s Directory of Investment
Managers and by searching the SEC documents and web sites of institutional managers. Our
last main dataset is the research coverage of sell-side equity analysts from Thomson Reuters’
I/B/E/S database. We augment this dataset with analyst location data.
In addition to the main data sources, we use several other standard datasets. We obtain price,
volume, return, and industry membership data from the Center for Research on Security Prices
(CRSP). The firm headquarters location data are from the historical header file of the CRSP-
Compustat merged (CCM) database. We obtain the performance benchmarks for computing
characteristic-adjusted stock returns from Russell Wermers’ web site.6 Data on auditors’ identity
and various other firm attributes are from Compustat.
We also use state-level Presidential elections data to identify the political orientation of
U.S. states.7 We obtain additional state-level demographic characteristics from the U.S. Census
Bureau. Specifically, we consider state population density and the state education level (the
proportion of state population above age 25 that has completed a bachelor’s degree or higher) in
our local ownership regressions. Further, using the religious adherence data from the “Churches
and Church Membership” files available through the American Religion Data Archive (ARDA),
we compute the proportion of Catholics (CATH) and the proportion of Protestants (PROT) in
a state. Using the two religion variables, we define the Catholic-Protestant ratio (CPRATIO)
to capture the relative proportions of Catholics and Protestants in a state. We also measure the
overall religiosity of a region.
3.2. Excess Local Ownership, Holdings, and Coverage
The firm-level local institutional ownership is at the core of our hypotheses pertaining to the
behavior of local investors. Following Korniotis and Kumar (2013), we measure quarterly local
institutional ownership for each firm-state pair as the ratio of the number of firm shares held by
institutions located within the state and the total institutional share ownership at the end of
the quarter. We normalize the local institutional ownership by the weight of local (i.e., state)
institutions in the aggregate institutional portfolio. This weight represents the expected level of
6The web site is http://www.smith.umd.edu/faculty/rwermers/ftpsite/Dgtw/coverpage.htm.
7The election data are obtained from David Leip’s web site: http://www.uselectionatlas.org.
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ownership by local institutions if they exhibit no abnormal preference for local firms. The state-
level benchmarks account for the non-uniform geographic distribution of institutions across the
U.S. and are higher for states with greater concentration of institutional investor capital. The
difference between the quarterly firm-state institutional ownership and the percentage weight of
the state’s institutional investors in the aggregate institutional portfolio is our measure of excess
local institutional ownership, LOCOWN:
LOCOWNij =
State j institutional ownership in firm i
Total institutional ownership in firm i
−
Dollar value of institutional portfolios in state j
Dollar value of aggregate institutional portfolios
(1)
In addition to the firm-level local ownership measure, we use an institution-level local bias
measure in some of our empirical tests. Following previous local bias studies (e.g., Coval and
Moskowitz (2001), Ivkovic´ and Weisbenner (2005)), we define the local bias of institution i
located in state s as:
HQ Local Biasi = Institution i’s portfolio weight of firms headquartered in state s
− Market portfolio weight of firms headquartered in state s. (2)
The first term in equation (2) is the value of institution i’s holdings in firms headquartered in
the institution’s state divided by the total value of all institution i’s holdings. The second term
is the benchmark weight defined as the total value all firms headquartered in institution i’s state
divided by the value of the aggregate market portfolio. If institution i holds the market portfolio
as prescribed by traditional portfolio theory, the HQ local bias measure would be zero.
To test our hypotheses regarding equity analysts’ coverage decisions, we measure the quar-
terly local coverage of each analyst as the fraction of local stocks in that analyst’s stock coverage
portfolio and normalize this measure by the fraction of local stocks in the market portfolio:
LOCCOVa = Fraction of stocks that are local in analyst a’s coverage portfolio
− Fraction of local firms in the market portfolio. (3)
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3.3. Information Environment Proxies
To characterize a firm’s information environment, we use multiple firm attributes. Our first
set of proxies includes market-based measures of information asymmetry. Specifically, we use
stock turnover as a measure of stock liquidity because better disclosure policies should reduce
information asymmetry and, thus, result in higher liquidity (e.g., Glosten and Milgrom (1985),
Leuz and Verrecchia (2000)). Our second market-based measure is idiosyncratic volatility be-
cause firms with low quality earnings have higher idiosyncratic return volatility (e.g., Diamond
and Verrecchia (1991), Rajgopal and Venkatachalam (2011)).8 Last, we consider idiosyncratic
skewness of firms’ stock returns because higher information ambiguity induces higher volatility
and skewness in stock returns (Epstein and Schneider (2008)).
Our second set of proxies for a firm’s information environment reflects the presence of in-
formation intermediaries. This choice is based on the notion that the presence of reputable
auditors and other information intermediaries is associated with more transparent and compet-
itive information environments (e.g., Healy and Palepu (2001)). Analyst following is directly
related to availability of management forecasts (e.g., Soffer, Walther, and Thiagarajan (2000))
and disclosure quality (e.g., Lang and Lundholm (1993)). Auditors provide assurance that fi-
nancial statements comply with accounting standards. They also alleviate concerns about the
quality of information disclosed, as attested by the evidence that hiring a reputable auditor is
beneficial even if not required by regulation (e.g., Leftwich (1983), Menon and Williams (1991)).
Our last information environment proxy is based on accounting data. Specifically, following
common practice, we use the absolute modified-Jones discretionary accruals as a proxy for
earnings quality. Higher values of this measure are likely to be associated with greater earnings
management and worse information environments (e.g., Cohen, Dey, and Lys (2008)).
Table 1 provides summary statistics for the main variables used in our empirical analysis.
We report key statistics for the full sample, as well as separately for the pre-regulation (1996 to
1999) and post-regulation (2000 to 2008) periods. The Appendix summarizes the definitions of
all the variables. In most of our tests, the sample period is from 1996 to 2008.9
8Although low earnings quality can lead to higher idiosyncratic volatility, recent work by Hutton, Marcus,
and Tehranian (2009) may indicate otherwise. Hutton et al. find that opaque (low quality) financial reports are
associated with higher R2 and, thus, lower scaled idiosyncratic volatility. While we use the unscaled measure of
idiosyncratic volatility in our tests similar to Rajgopal and Venkatachalam (2011), we recognize that the recent
evidence in Hutton et al. raises questions about its interpretation.
9The exception is due to the fact that the PIN decomposition data from Duarte and Young (2009) are only
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4. Local Institutional Investors
In this section we discuss the evidence for the investment behavior and performance of local
institutional investors. We begin by focusing on the results for the firm-level excess ownership
of local institutions, and follow with the state institution-level local bias and local portfolio
performance evidence.
4.1. Local Ownership
Figure 1 plots the time-series of the excess ownership of institutional investors located around
firms’ headquarters. In particular, the figure shows the annual mean excess local ownership
(LOCOWN) computed at the end of each fiscal year as described in equation (1). Table 2
reports the actual numbers as well as more details regarding the time series.10
Although the overall level of institutional ownership exhibits an increasing trend (see Column
(1) in Table 2), there is a notable decline in the level of local institutional ownership following
the new rules. The average excess local ownership is consistently around 8% in each year of the
pre-regulation period (see Column (2)), it drops sharply to below 6% immediately following the
passage of Reg FD, and finally stabilizes at around 4% in the post-2003 period. The notable drop
in excess local ownership mainly reflects changes in actual local ownership, as the benchmark
level of local ownership does not vary much over time (see Column (3)).
In absolute terms, the drop in excess local ownership is larger for smaller firms. Specifically,
the excess local ownership for small, medium, and large firms drop from 14.42%, 5.86%, and
2.98% in 2000 to 8.46%, 2.80%, and 1.91% in 2004, respectively. However, in relative terms,
excess local ownership levels drops by about half across all size groups (see Columns (4) to (6)).
The evidence in Figure 1 and Table 2 suggests that there is a structural break in the local
ownership time series around the year 2000. More formally, using Chow (1960) tests to identify
potential breakpoints in the 1997 to 2007 period, we find that the most significant breaks occur
in either 2000 or 2001. Our analysis also indicates that the break occurs earlier for larger firms
than for smaller ones. This evidence is consistent with larger firms complying with Reg FD
earlier than smaller firms due to their lower relative fixed cost of conducting open calls and their
available for the 1996 to 2004 period.
10Discrepancies in mean LOCOWN across Tables 1 and 2 arise because the sample in Table 1 is restricted to
firm-year observations for which we could obtain information environment variables.
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relative lack of concerns about attracting analysts coverage (Goshen and Parchomovsky (2001)).
Overall, consistent with Reg FD and SOX reducing information asymmetries between local
and nonlocal investors, the evidence in Figure 1 and Table 2 shows that institutional ownership
around firms’ headquarters declines greatly in the new regulatory regime. While these time-series
patterns support our conjecture (H1-i), our next tests exploit the variation in firms’ information
environments to identify more sharply the effects of the new rules.
4.1.1 Relation between Local Ownership and Information Environment
To conduct our next set of tests, we estimate a series of pooled cross-sectional regressions. The
dependent variable is the firm-year level excess local ownership (LOCOWN). The main explana-
tory variables are attributes that characterize firms’ information environment. In addition, we
include firm HQ state time-varying attributes and fixed effects to account for state-level factors
that affect local ownership patterns. The level of excess local institutional ownership is mea-
sured at the first quarter end following the firm fiscal year, while all explanatory variables are
measured during or as of the end of the firm fiscal year. Following Petersen (2009), we compute
the t-statistics using standard errors clustered by year and firm HQ state.
Our conjecture is that disclosure rules affect excess local institutional ownership directly
(H1-i), as well as its relation with the firm’s information environment (H2-i). In particular, we
expect the local informational advantage to be lower in the new regulatory regime and, thus,
excess local ownership to decline (H1-i). Moreover, we expect firms’ information environment
to become a weaker determinant of excess local ownership following the new rules (H2-i).
Table 3 reports regression estimates from the models with time-varying coefficients. Consis-
tent with H1-i, we find that local ownership levels are significantly lower after the implementation
of the new rules (see Column (1)). Excess annual local ownership drops on average by 2.46% in
2000 onwards compared to the pre-regulation period.
In the full-model specification (see Column (2)), we find that most coefficient estimates have
the predicted signs and are statistically as well as economically significant. Specifically, firms
with worse information environments (i.e., those with low turnover, high volatility, absence of
major auditor, or no analyst following) have significantly higher excess local ownership prior
to the new rules. Moreover, consistent with H2-i, the relations between excess local ownership
and firm information environment proxies become significantly weaker in the new regulatory
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regime.11
For example, during the pre-regulation period, the presence of a major auditor reduces excess
local ownership by 7.15%. In contrast, after the new rules, the presence of a major auditor is
associated with a statistically insignificant reduction of 7.15 − 5.03 = 2.12% in excess local
ownership. Similarly, a one standard deviation increase in idiosyncratic volatility is associated
with 0.21 × 6.699% = 1.41% higher excess local ownership in the pre-regulation period, which
is economically meaningful relative to the mean local ownership level of 5.39%. In the post-
regulation period, however, this relation becomes statistically and economically insignificant.
Although the presence of a major auditor has the largest effect on local ownership, the coefficients
on other information environment proxies such as turnover, idiosyncratic volatility, and analyst
coverage reveal qualitatively similar patterns.
The overall weakening of the relation between firm-level information environment and excess
local ownership supports our conjecture (H2-i), and suggests that disclosure rules are a first
order determinant of institutional investors’ preferences for local stocks.
4.1.2 Difference-in-Difference Tests
The earlier evidence supports the conjecture that the information environment drives insti-
tutional investors’ preferences for local stocks. However, the causality may be in the other
direction, if the geographic concentration of ownership structure affects the firm’s information
environment. For example, a firm with high local ownership concentration may not require a
major auditor because it may more easily communicate with a large proportion of its investor
base directly. Similarly, the demand for analyst services may be lower when a firm’s local own-
ership is higher, which makes those services less valuable and reduces analysts’ incentives to
cover the firm.
To identify the causal effect of the information environment on excess local ownership, we
perform difference-in-difference tests similar to other studies that examine the effects of financial
regulation (e.g., Bushee, Matsumoto, and Miller (2004), Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007)).
With these tests, we aim to assess whether the changes in excess local ownership following the
11Two of the seven information environment proxies have insignificant coefficient estimates. This is due to
the high correlation among several of those proxies. Indeed, when we estimate the model including only one
information environment proxy at a time, the coefficient estimates are always statistically significant with the
predicted sign.
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new rules are larger for firms whose information environment is less transparent and competitive
prior to the new rules.
Table 4 presents the estimates from the difference-in-difference regression models. The de-
pendent variable in these models is the firm-level change in excess local ownership in each year
of the new regulation regime relative to the pre-regulation regime. The explanatory variables
of interest are the firm information environment proxies prior to the new rules. We measure
all pre-regulation variables at the end of fiscal year 1999.12 We also include post-regulation
firm and state factors, as well as state fixed effects to control for anticipated variation in local
ownership changes.
Consistent with our main conjecture and earlier results, the average firm-level change in
excess local ownership is significantly negative in the new regulatory regime. Further, we find
that the drop in local ownership is larger among stocks with poor information environment prior
to the new rules: firms with low stock turnover, high discretionary accruals, without a major
auditor, or no analyst following. For example, the coefficient on major auditor in Column (2)
suggests that the excess local ownership of firms without a major auditor prior to the new rules
drops on average by an incremental 2.80% compared to firms with a major auditor.
The results are qualitatively similar for other information environment proxies even though
not all estimates are statistically significant. Overall, the results from the difference-in-difference
tests support Hypothesis H2-ii and suggest that a firm’s information environment has a causal
impact on its excess local ownership.
4.1.3 Robustness Checks
In this section, we discuss the robustness of our baseline results regarding institutional investors.
First, we investigate whether our findings reflect an increased awareness against holding own
employer stocks rather than regulation-induced declines in local ownership. In particular, we
redefine the excess local ownership measure after excluding institutional investors that are clas-
sified as public or corporate pension funds, university endowments, or miscellaneous. We repeat
our main tests using this restricted measure and report the results in columns labeled “No PF”
in Tables 3 and 4. Our main conclusions are unaffected and in fact some of the earlier results
12We obtain qualitatively similar results when we repeat the analysis using the 1996-1999 time-series averages
for the relevant pre-regulation information environment and local ownership variables.
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become more significant statistically.
Next, we control for the effect of low priced stocks on our baseline results. Low priced
stocks are typically characterized by more volatile and skewed returns, and are more likely to
be subject to potential microstructure biases (e.g., large bid-ask spread), which may have a
disproportionate impact on our empirical findings. To assess whether our main results depend
on the unique attributes of low-priced stocks, in Column (4) of Tables 3 and 4, we repeat our
tests after excluding stocks priced below $2. The evidence shows that our results are robust to
imposing this restriction and indicates that the patterns of disappearing local ownership are not
restricted to the subsample of low priced stocks.13
Another potential concern stems from the uneven geographical distribution of firms’ head-
quarters across the U.S. The top two states, California and New York, account for approximately
11% of the firm-years in our sample. The economic forces at play at these locations may be
unique. In particular, there is a high concentration of technology firms in California, for which
information asymmetries may be more severe. In addition, the pre-regulation period corresponds
to the Internet frenzy period, which could also influence our results. Further, given the high
concentration of financial institutions and large brokerage houses in New York, Reg FD may
have a disproportionate impact on New York-based firms.
Column (5) of Tables 3 and 4 reports the regression estimates for subsamples of firms whose
headquarters are not in California or New York. These subsample results are qualitatively
similar to the full-sample results, which indicates that the phenomenon of disappearing local
information is not restricted to the two most business populated states.
To further control for the burst of the tech bubble that coincided with the adoption of Reg
FD, we also repeat our main tests after excluding technology firms. The column labeled “No
Tech” in Tables 3 and 4 reports the results of these tests. Our conclusions are not affected by the
exclusion of technology firms, as the magnitudes and statistical significances of the regression
estimates are similar to our baseline results.
13 We also restricted the sample using a $5 price filter and obtain qualitatively similar results, although the
power of our tests diminishes because the sample size decreases by approximately 15%.
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4.2. Regulation and Informational Advantage of Local Investors
In this section, we examine the performance of local institutional investors conditional on the
regulatory regime. Our main objective is to assess whether the institutional investors’ local
informational advantage declines following the new rules designed to curb selective dissemination
of corporate information and improve the reliability of firms’ financial reports.
Because we shift our focus on investor portfolios as our unit of observation, before estimating
the local performance, we perform a test similar in spirit to the local ownership analysis reported
in Table 2. Specifically, we calculate the Excess Local Weight of each institutional investor’s
quarterly portfolio snapshot as the percentage of the investor’s portfolio invested in stocks
located in the investor’s state (local stocks) minus the percentage of the “market portfolio”
located in the investor’s state. Then, we compute the average excess local weights across all
institutional investors’ portfolios in each quarter and report in Table 5 the time-series average
of the mean quarterly portfolio over various subperiods. When averaging across institutions’
quarterly portfolios, we weigh them equally or by their total value at the beginning of the
quarter. This analysis is similar to the analysis in Coval and Moskowitz (2001), except that we
use the full sample of 13-F institutions (rather than the mutual fund sample) and extend their
analysis (that ends in 1995) to 2008.
Independent of the averaging method, the results are similar to the evidence based on firms
as our unit of observation. Institutional investors’ local bias is large and significant in the pre-
regulation period, and declines significantly after the new rules. Using equal-weighted averages,
for example, the excess local weights of institutional portfolios decline by more than 55 percent
in the 2004–2008 period relative to the pre-regulation period (1996–1999).
4.2.1 Local Institutional Portfolio Performance
Coval and Moskowitz (2001) find that mutual fund managers tend to earn higher returns on
the local stocks in their portfolios, consistent with a local informational advantage. We follow
Coval and Moskowitz (2001) in our analysis of the performance of institutional investors’ local
and non-local holdings. In this analysis, the unit of observation is the quarterly performance
of the location-based subportfolios of each institutional investor in our sample. Specifically,
for each institution with non-zero portfolio weight in local stocks, we calculate the quarterly
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characteristics-adjusted returns of its local and non-local stock portfolios, as well as the corre-
sponding performance differential (local minus non-local). Local Portfolio comprises stocks in
the investor’s portfolio that are headquartered in the investor’s state, while Non-Local Portfolio
comprises all other holdings of the same investor. We normalize stock returns using Daniel, Grin-
blatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997) approach to control for variations in size, book-to-market,
and past 12-month return.
As shown in Panel A of Table 6, local holdings of institutional investors outperform non-local
holdings prior to the new rules (1996-1999). Using dollar-weighted averaging, local holdings out-
perform non-local holdings by about 13 basis points per month, or about 1.5 percent annually.
Consistent with our conjecture (H3-i), however, the superior performance of local holdings dis-
appears following the new rules. The performance differential is not significantly different from
zero and the point estimates are generally negative in the post-regulation subperiods. In untab-
ulated tests, we find similar evidence when using stock-level returns as the unit of observation.
Thus, our performance results do not depend on the unit of aggregation (i.e., firm or institution).
In Panel B, we examine the performance of institutional “trades”. Given that we do not
observe actual trades of 13-F institutions, we use the quarterly net changes in holdings to
measure the (net) trading by each institution during a quarter. We then measure the average
performance of net changes in local/non-local holdings.14 The evidence in Panel B is similar to
the holdings-based performance results in Panel A. Consistent with reduced local information
advantage following the new rules (H3-i), local trades earn abnormally high average returns (i.e.,
about 1.8% higher annual return than non-local trades) prior to 2000, but this superior local
performance declines and in fact disappears in the new regulatory regime.
5. Regulation and Local Equity Analysts
In this section, we discuss the evidence pertaining to Hypotheses H1-ii and H3-ii for the behav-
ior and performance of local equity analysts around the implementation of Reg FD and SOX.
14This is the “Portfolio Change Measure” introduced by Grinblatt and Titman (1993) and referred to as the
GT measure in Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997). More precisely, the trading performance is
calculated as the difference between the performance of the investor portfolio as reported at the end of the
previous quarter and that of the investor portfolio as reported at the beginning of the previous quarter. Because
the returns from the part of the portfolio that does not change over the quarter cancel out, the resulting trading
performance measure solely depends on the part of the portfolio that changes during the previous quarter.
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To the extent that the new rules increase the competition and transparency of firms’ informa-
tion environment, we expect that analysts’ local informational advantage and, thus, their local
coverage bias would decline in the new regulatory regime.
5.1. Regulation and the Behavior of Local Equity Analysts
We begin by examining analysts’ propensity to cover local stocks conditional on the regulatory
regime. For this purpose, as described in equation (3), we define analyst’s excess local coverage
as the difference between the fraction of local stocks in the analyst coverage portfolio minus
the fraction of local stocks in the market portfolio. Unlike institutional investors, there is no
obvious weighting scheme for analyst coverage. Therefore, we examine both the equal- and
value-weighted fraction of stocks covered by an analyst.
In untabulated analysis, we find that sell-side analysts around corporate headquarters display
an abnormal propensity to cover local stocks, but their excess local coverage propensity declines
significantly following the new rules. In the pre-2000 period, the value-weighted analyst excess
local coverage is approximately 8%, while the equal-weighted excess coverage is approximately
11%. In the new regulatory regime, consistent with H1-ii, the excess local coverage measure
declines by about 40% to approximately 4.5% (value-weighted) or 7% (equal-weighted).
To assess the statistical significance of these patterns, Table 7 reports the parameter esti-
mates from pooled cross-sectional regression models of analyst excess local coverage on a post-
regulation indicator variable (equal to 1 in years 2000 onwards), POSTREG, controlling for
analyst characteristics and state fixed effects. In particular, the models include analyst tenure,
past performance, number of firms covered, and an indicator variable for analysts employed by
prestigious brokerage houses. The average excess local coverage throughout our sample period
is 9.61 (6.28) percent using equal- (value-) weighting.
The estimates in models (1) and (3) support our conjecture (H1-ii). In particular, the
evidence indicates that, relative to the pre-regulatory period, excess local coverage declines by
3.07 to 3.48 percentage points following the new rules. Conditioning on the prestige of brokerage
houses, we find that analysts from prestigious brokerage houses have significantly lower local
bias prior to 2000, perhaps because brokerage house prestige would grant the analyst better
access to any firm. Following the new rules, however, the prestige-driven differences in local
bias across analysts disappear due to the large decrease in the local bias of analysts from less
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prestigious employers. This evidence suggests analysts may enjoy more similar access across
firms in the new regulatory regime.
5.2. Regulation and the Performance of Local Equity Analysts
We next examine the performance of local analysts. For this purpose, we focus on the accuracy
of the analysts’ quarterly earnings forecasts. Since analysts are evaluated against their peers,
we employ two relative accuracy measures that compare an analyst’s forecast against all other
analysts’ forecasts for the same earnings report. The first measure is an indicator variable for
whether the analyst’s forecast error is below the median peer error. The second measure is the
percentile ranking of the analyst’s forecast error. In addition, following Malloy (2005), we also
use the demeaned absolute forecast error (DAFE) to measure analyst forecast accuracy, where
a negative (positive) DAFE implies better (worse) than average analyst forecast accuracy.
Table 8 reports the coefficient estimates from regression models that relate the analyst accu-
racy measures to a LOCAL indicator variable, which equals one when the analyst and the firm
headquarters are in the same state, the interaction of LOCAL with POSTREG, and quarter-
analyst fixed effects that absorb all analyst-quarter skill and characteristics factors. We do not
include the stand-alone regime variable, POSTREG, or any time fixed effects because they are
subsumed by the analyst-quarter fixed effects. We cluster standard errors by earnings report
(i.e., covered firm-quarter).
The evidence in Table 8 indicates that local analysts are more accurate than their peers
prior to the new rules, consistent with the local informational advantage documented in Malloy
(2005). However, the superior accuracy of local analysts declines significantly following Reg FD,
consistent with our conjecture H3-ii. Adding up the point estimates of LOCAL and LOCAL
× POSTREG in Columns (1), (2), or (3), the superior performance of local analysts is at best
negligible in the new regulatory regime.
When we estimate the forecast accuracy models for different subperiods, we find that LO-
CAL has a significantly negative coefficient estimate prior to the new rules (see Column (4)),
consistent with Malloy (2005). However, the coefficient is statistically and economically insignif-
icant during the post-2000 period (see Column (5)), consistent with our conjecture (H3-ii). This
evidence supports the notion that local analysts have no local informational advantage in the
new regulatory regime.
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Collectively, the results in Tables 7 and 8 are consistent with our predictions regarding local
analysts’ behavior and performance around the passage of Reg FD and SOX (H1-i and H3-ii).
In line with the institutional investor results in the previous section, this evidence lends further
support to our main conjecture that the new disclosure rules at the turn of the millennium
reduced the informational advantage of local capital market participants.
5.3. Local Analysts and Local Investors
In this short subsection, we discuss some untabulated results about the relation between the
informational advantage of local analysts and local investors. Specifically, we examine whether
recommendations by local analysts drive the behavior and performance of local institutions.
For this purpose, we estimate the institutional local bias and performance conditional on local
analysts’ presence. Specifically, we sort states into three groups based on the number of analysts
in the state: top 5 states, 6th to 20th, and others. This grouping is done to ensure that
institutional investors are spread as evenly as possible across the three groups. Then, within
each group, we measure the institutional investors’ local bias as well as their subportfolios
performance across the different regulatory regimes.
We find that the pattern of declining local investor bias is similar, irrespective of the local
analyst presence. However, the time-series patterns in local performance are quite different. In
states with a high number of local analysts, institutional investors do not experience superior
local performance both before and after the new rules. In contrast, institutions exhibit superior
local performance in states with low analyst presence prior to the new rules and this superior
performance declines significantly in the new regime.
The evidence from these supplemental tests suggests that the local informational advantage
of institutional investors does not merely reflect the informational advantage of local equity
analysts. In fact, it seems that the two sets of local agents likely compete for the acquisition
and exploitation of local information prior to the new rules enacted at the turn of the millennium.
6. Regulation and Ownership-Adverse Selection Relation
In this section, we examine the relation between local ownership and stock market-based mea-
sures of adverse selection. Our main objective is to determine whether market outcomes associate
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excess local ownership with future informed trading and, importantly for our purposes, whether
this relation changes around the implementation of Reg FD and SOX rules. A natural corollary
of our conjecture that local informational advantage declines with the new rules is that the
local ownership-adverse selection relation would be positive prior to the new rules and become
significantly weaker in the new regulatory regime.
6.1. Regulation and Market-Based Adverse Selection Measures
To conduct our tests, we rely on two sets of microstructure variables intended to proxy for
adverse selection in equity trading. The first set is based on the probability of informed trading
(PIN) introduced by Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2002), which Duarte and Young (2009)
decompose into the probability of private information-driven trades (i.e., ADJPIN) and the
probability of symmetric order flow-driven trades (i.e., PSOS).
The second set is based on trading spreads. We use the effective spread, defined as the
difference between the executed price and the midpoint of the bid-ask spread. Effective spreads
reflect the price impact of trading, which theory indicates should depend on the market-maker’s
(or liquidity provider’s) expectation of trading against informed agents.
Consistent with Hypothesis H4, we find that the adverse selection components of stock
prices are on average directly and significantly related to prior year-end excess local ownership
levels across the sample period (see Table 9, Panel A). When we condition on the regulatory
regime, however, we find significant differences in the strength of those relations. The results in
Panel B of Table 9 indicate that the relation between ADJPIN and local bias weakens in the
new regulatory regime and becomes statistically insignificant. In contrast, the relation between
PSOS and local ownership is positive and significant prior to the new rules, and continues to
be so in the new regime. Therefore, while the positive relation between PIN and the degree of
local ownership reflects both adverse selection and liquidity considerations prior to Reg FD, it
is predominantly driven by liquidity consideration in the post-regulation environment.
The trading spread-based evidence supports similar inferences. The results from these tests
are reported in Columns (4) to (6) of Panels A and B in Table 9. In the pre-2000 period,
there is a significant positive relation between local ownership and subsequent spreads, and this
relation becomes significantly weaker after the reforms. When we separate the 3-day window
(i.e., −1:+1) around earnings announcements (SPDEARN) from non-earnings-announcement
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periods (SPDOTH), the results are qualitatively similar. However, the evidence indicates that
the attenuating effects of regulatory changes on the local ownership-adverse selection relation is
more significant during periods of less intense public disclosures.
Overall, the results from our microstructure-based tests support the notion that market
participants expect local investors to engage in (privately) informed trading prior to the new
rules and that this expectation is greatly reduced in the new regulatory regime.
6.2. Zooming in on Earnings Announcement Windows
In this subsection, we focus more sharply on the periods around earnings announcements to
attempt to disentangle the selective access versus superior information processing channels as the
primary source of local investors’ informational advantage in the pre-2000 period. The evidence
in Table 9 indicates that the attenuating effects of the new rules on the local ownership-adverse
selection relation is more acute outside of short windows around earnings announcements. This
attenuating effect may be due to the reduced selective disclosure provided to local investors. Or,
it may be due to reduced opportunities for investors to exploit local sources in processing public
information due to the increased quality of firms’ disclosures. The selective access explanation
implies that the attenuating effect of the new rules should be stronger for periods leading to
public disclosures - i.e., prior to earnings announcements, while the higher quality disclosure
explanation implies that the effect should be stronger for periods after public disclosures - i.e.,
following earnings announcements.
Similar to our previous tests, we use effective spreads as our main construct to proxy for
the expected presence of informed trading. Panel C of Table 9 reports the results from the
additional spread-based tests. Specifically, we report the relation between local ownership and
spreads in the periods before and after earnings announcements, conditional on the regulatory
regime. Although local ownership is associated with higher spreads both before and after earn-
ings announcement, we find evidence of an attenuating effect of the new rules on the local
ownership-adverse selection relation only in the pre-earnings announcement window. This find-
ing suggests that the new rules affected local investors’ informational advantage mainly through
reduced access to corporate information prior to its public disclosure, as mandated by Reg FD.
Overall, these supplemental results indicate that the local informational advantage of in-
stitutional investors prior to the new rules likely reflects selective access to firm management.
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Furthermore, the evidence supports the notion that this source of local informational advantage
is effectively curbed after the implementation of the new rules.
7. Summary and Conclusion
We examine whether the introduction of disclosure rules that improve the transparency and
competitiveness of the information environment affects the behavior and performance of capital
market participants – institutional investors and equity analysts – located near the firms.
We find that the local bias of these market participants is greatly reduced following the
adoption of Regulation Fair Disclosure and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Suggesting a causal im-
pact, the decline in local bias is more salient among firms that operate in less transparent and
competitive information environments prior to the new rules. Further indicating a decline in
local informational advantage, the abnormal performance of institutional investors and analysts
around corporate headquarters declines sharply following the new rules. Even at the aggregate
market level, the degree of informed trading attributed to local investors declines significantly.
Supplemental tests indicate that the new rules affected institutional investors’ behavior primarily
by curtailing selective access to corporate information.
Overall, we demonstrate that firms’ information environment is a first-order determinant
of capital market participants’ local information advantage. Therefore, disclosure rules that
improve the transparency and competitiveness of the information playing field can have a large
impact on agents’ incentives to focus on local firms.
In future research, it would be interesting to investigate whether and to what extent the
staggered implementations of SOX-like regulations in major capital markets around the world
affect home bias – the international counterpart of the local bias phenomenon. If, like in the
United States, the information environment affects domestic and foreign investors’ participation
in equity markets, we would expect a decline in home bias and a concurrent inflow of foreign
investors’ capital in countries that adopt more stringent disclosure rules.
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Figure 1. Excess local ownership around firm headquarters. This figure shows the mean excess equal-
weighted local ownership time series for the full sample of firms. Excess local ownership is the state institutional
ownership of a firm’s HQ state minus that state’s average state institutional ownership. Small and large firms
subsamples contain firms in the lowest and highest firm size quartiles, respectively. Additional details about the
variables are available in the Appendix.
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Table 1
Summary Statistics
This table reports the summary statistics for main variables used in the empirical analysis. The variables are defined in the Appendix.
The full sample period is from 1996 to 2008. PREREG period includes firm-fiscal years ending starting in 1996 and ending prior to or
in calendar year 1999. POSTREG period includes firm-fiscal years ending in calendar year 2000 onward. The definitions of all variables
are provided in the Appendix. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Full Sample: 1996-2008 PREREG: 1996-1999 POSTREG: 2000-2008
Variable Short Name N Mean Median Std Dev Mean Median Mean Median
Firm-Level Local Ownership Measure
Local Ownership HQ LOCOWN 47, 625 5.390 0.300 16.870 6.760 0.660 5.250 0.190
Next Quarter Return:
Raw Return RAWRET 44, 546 3.290 0.700 32.570 5.110 0.850 1.500 −0.270
CRSP-EW Adj. EWRET 44, 546 −0.380 −2.760 31.050 −0.550 −4.430 −0.490 −2.210
CRSP-VW Adj. VWRET 44, 546 2.340 −0.450 31.560 2.670 −1.980 3.240 1.280
DGTW Char. Adj. CADJRET 38, 062 1.200 −1.050 29.320 1.710 −1.550 1.860 0.020
Information Environment Variables
Turnover TURN 47, 625 1.406 0.933 1.432 1.247 0.790 1.495 0.959
Idio. Volatility IVOL 47, 625 9.562 7.762 6.699 10.103 8.500 12.981 11.242
Idio. Skewness ISKEW 47, 625 0.139 0.133 0.706 0.164 0.169 0.159 0.141
Major Auditor MAJAUD 47, 625 0.847 1.000 0.360 0.925 1.000 0.917 1.000
Analyst Coverage ANCOV 47, 625 6.006 4.000 6.394 5.627 4.000 5.670 4.000
Num. of Analysts NUMANA 47, 625 0.821 1.000 0.383 0.812 1.000 0.814 1.000
Abs. Disc. Accruals ABSDACC 38, 678 0.273 0.071 0.644 0.125 0.055 0.418 0.135
Continued . . .
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Full Sample: 1996-2008 PREREG: 1996-1999 POSTREG: 2000-2008
Variable Short Name N Mean Median Std Dev Mean Median Mean Median
Other Firm Characteristics
log(Market Cap) MCAP 47, 625 12.823 12.760 1.941 12.544 12.450 12.491 12.471
Book-To-Market BM 47, 553 0.583 0.472 0.584 0.582 0.458 0.672 0.536
Financial Leverage FINLEV 47, 500 0.180 0.115 0.201 0.193 0.136 0.184 0.111
Firm Age AGE 47, 625 14.848 9.000 15.507 13.615 8.000 14.119 8.000
6m Lagged Return RET6M 46, 296 0.083 0.034 0.419 0.117 0.054 0.044 0.008
Stock Price PRICE 47, 625 21.884 17.365 18.180 21.189 16.726 20.967 15.620
Lottery-Type Stock LOTT 47, 604 0.335 0.000 0.472 0.325 0.000 0.333 0.000
Local Attributes
Education EDU 47, 625 25.490 26.100 3.701 24.752 25.320 26.092 26.600
Pop. Density POPDEN 47, 625 313.783 217.998 455.044 305.148 211.515 319.088 217.998
Cath.-Prot. Ratio CPRATIO 47, 625 0.499 0.521 0.108 0.505 0.523 0.495 0.520
Religiosity REL 47, 625 1.426 0.956 1.236 1.405 0.956 1.493 1.020
Republican REPUB 47, 625 0.731 1.000 0.443 0.815 1.000 0.706 1.000
Microstructure Variables
PIN PIN 12, 483 0.177 0.151 0.096 0.185 0.159 0.173 0.145
Adv. Selection ADJPIN 12483 0.145 0.127 0.070 0.151 0.135 0.141 0.121
Liquidity PSOS 12, 483 0.257 0.216 0.136 0.263 0.219 0.259 0.223
Effective Spread SPREAD 35, 057 0.404 0.186 0.541 0.617 0.399 0.384 0.188
Around Earnings SPDEARN 35, 057 0.422 0.199 0.581 0.626 0.408 0.414 0.206
Excl. Earnings SPDOTH 35, 057 0.403 0.185 0.541 0.616 0.398 0.383 0.187
Analyst-Related Measures
High Performance HIGHPERF 23, 566 0.345 0.333 0.208 0.346 0.333 0.331 0.316
Tenure TENURE 23, 566 23.626 17.000 20.218 23.359 18.000 23.332 17.000
Prestigious Broker PBROKER 23, 566 0.334 0.000 0.472 0.342 0.000 0.376 0.000
Num. of Firms Covered NFCOVER 23, 566 10.995 10.000 6.175 11.117 10.000 10.329 10.000
Demeaned Abs. Fore. Err. DAFE 786,605 −0.093 −0.008 0.344 −0.132 −0.005 −0.172 −0.008
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Table 2
Annual Local Ownership and Ownership Concentration Estimates
This table reports annual averages for local ownership, ownership concentration, and local analyst
coverage measures. All measures are multiplied by 100 to improve readability. For comparison, in
Column (1), we report the mean equal-weighted institutional ownership (IO) across all CRSP firms.
Column (2) reports the full-sample annual excess local ownership estimates for firm headquarters (HQ)
states. To provide a benchmark, the mean expected level of local ownership is reported in Column (3).
Columns (4) to (6) report the excess local ownership estimates for small, mid-sized, and large firms,
respectively. The definitions of all variables are provided in the Appendix.
Excess Local Ownership (4-6)
Institutional Excess Expected Small Mid Large
Ownership Local Ownership Local Ownership Cap Cap Cap
Year (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1996 26.89 8.02 7.37 14.65 5.76 3.77
1997 27.96 7.87 7.35 13.73 5.88 3.94
1998 28.41 7.64 7.19 13.47 5.76 3.73
1999 28.27 7.90 7.58 14.31 5.50 3.51
2000 29.07 7.86 8.00 14.42 5.86 2.98
2001 30.56 6.80 7.84 12.37 5.05 2.91
2002 33.19 5.75 7.77 10.68 4.18 2.36
2003 36.09 5.53 7.46 10.53 3.74 2.26
2004 40.71 4.38 7.52 8.46 2.80 1.91
2005 42.70 4.28 7.59 8.29 3.06 1.55
2006 44.53 3.65 7.63 7.21 2.59 1.20
2007 48.46 3.66 7.84 6.61 3.11 1.30
2008 48.03 3.96 7.77 7.46 2.98 1.45
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Table 3
Information Environment and Excess Local Ownership:
Estimates From Time-Varying Coefficients Specifications
This table reports pooled cross-sectional regression coefficient estimates and corresponding t-statistics
for the relation between firm-level excess local ownership (LOCOWN) and the characteristics of the firm
information environment conditional on the regulatory regime. We also control for time-varying firm
and state characteristics and consider regime as well as state fixed effects. The level of firm local excess
institutional ownership is measured as of the fiscal year end, and all explanatory variables are measured
during the same fiscal year. POSTREG is an indicator variable equal to one for fiscal years ending
in calendar years 2000 and onward. The excess local ownership dependent variable in Column (3) is
recalculated after excluding institutional investors that are classified as public or corporate pension
funds, university endowments, or miscellaneous. The results in Columns (4) through (6) are based
on samples that exclude stocks priced below $2, firms located in California or New York states, and
high-tech firms, respectively. The definitions of all variables are provided in the Appendix. Following
Petersen (2009), the t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered by year
and state. The sample period is from 1996 to 2008.
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Dependent Variable: Excess Local Ownership (in %)
Firm Headquarters (HQ) Robustness (3-6)
No PF Prc.>$2 No CA/NY No Tech
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
POSTREG −2.46 −5.23 −5.05 −4.63 −5.35 −4.36
(−4.6) (−2.8) (−2.4) (−2.4) (−2.6) (−2.3)
TURN −0.69 −0.75 −0.58 −1.13 −0.73
(−2.8) (−2.6) (−2.7) (−3.6) (−2.8)
TURN × POSTREG 0.42 0.41 0.36 0.77 0.50
(1.6) (1.3) (1.5) (2.3) (1.7)
IVOL 0.21 0.21 0.18 0.21 0.20
(3.4) (3.3) (3.1) (2.8) (3.1)
IVOL × POSTREG −0.24 −0.23 −0.22 −0.25 −0.21
(−3.6) (−3) (−3.4) (−2.9) (−3.1)
ISKEW 0.07 0.10 0.10 0.06 −0.11
(0.3) (0.4) (0.4) (0.3) (−0.4)
ISKEW × POSTREG 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.14 0.34
(0.2) (0.1) (0.1) (0.5) (1.1)
MAJAUD −7.15 −7.32 −6.28 −8.83 −6.38
(−5.6) (−5.7) (−4.8) (−4.8) (−6.2)
MAJAUD × POSTREG 5.03 5.16 4.33 5.24 3.87
(3.8) (3.7) (3.1) (2.7) (3.4)
ANCOV −4.28 −4.08 −3.56 −4.76 −4.70
(−5.8) (−5.5) (−4.7) (−6.5) (−5.2)
ANCOV × POSTREG 1.2 0.84 0.75 2.89 1.39
(1.1) (0.8) (0.7) (3.3) (1.2)
ABSDACC RANK 0.27 0.11 0.27 0.09 0.11
(1.3) (0.6) (1.3) (0.5) (0.5)
ABSDACC RANK × POSTREG −0.17 0.04 −0.16 −0.03 −0.05
(−0.7) (0.2) (−0.6) (−0.1) (−0.2)
LOCANCOV 0.64 0.81 0.57 1.19 0.80
(1.6) (2.2) (1.5) (3.5) (2.2)
LOCANCOV × POSTREG −0.96 −1.22 −0.65 −0.92 −0.96
(−2.1) (−2.8) (−1.5) (−2.2) (−2.2)
Firm Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 40,640 36,558 36,558 34,846 24,940 25,695
R2 0.062 0.128 0.115 0.126 0.147 0.125
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Table 4
Change in Local Ownership and Pre-Regulation Information Environment
This table reports pooled cross-sectional regression coefficient estimates and corresponding t-statistics
predicting the firm-level changes in excess local ownership relative to end of fiscal year 1999 level of that
measure. The main independent variables are the characteristics of the firm information environment at
the end of fiscal year 1999. We also control for time-varying firm and state characteristics as well as state
fixed effects. The level of firm local excess institutional ownership is measured as of the fiscal year end,
and all explanatory variables are measured during the same fiscal year. The intercept in Column (1)
captures the general trend of the dependent variable for fiscal years ending in calendar years 2000 and
onward). The excess local ownership dependent variable in Column (3) is recalculated after excluding
institutional investors that are classified as public or corporate pension funds, university endowments,
or miscellaneous. The results in Columns (4) through (6) are based on samples that exclude stocks
priced below $2, firms located in California or New York states, and high-tech firms, respectively. The
definitions of all variables are provided in the Appendix. Following Petersen (2009), the t-statistics
reported in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered by year and state. The sample period
is from 1996 to 2008.
Dependent Variable: Change in Excess Local Ownership (in %), Relative to 1999
Firm Headquarters (HQ) Robustness
No PF Prc.>$2 No CA/NY No Tech
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intercept −2.02
(−7.9)
TURN1999 0.41 0.53 0.36 0.32 0.76
(3.8) (5.8) (3.6) (3.0) (4.1)
IVOL1999 0.08 −0.08 0.07 0.02 0.02
(3.5) (−3.4) (2.7) (0.7) (0.7)
ISKEW1999 −0.36 −0.70 −0.43 −0.44 −0.77
(−2.2) (−3.8) (−2.3) (−2.2) (−3.2)
MAJAUD1999 2.80 3.24 3.12 2.71 5.29
(4.5) (3.5) (4.4) (3) (5.9)
ANCOV1999 0.56 0.26 0.18 1.03 0.62
(1.4) (0.6) (0.5) (2.4) (1.3)
ABSDACC RANK1999 −1.25 −0.58 −1.07 −0.25 −0.91
(−5.6) (−3.5) (−5.0) (−2.0) (−3.3)
LOCANCOV1999 0.01 0.55 0.00 −0.55 −0.63
(0.0) (1.4) (0.0) (−2.5) (−2.1)
Firm Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 17,136 16,597 16,597 15,808 11,206 11,837
R2 0.000 0.053 0.051 0.058 0.063 0.079
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Table 5
Local Bias at Institutional Level: Subperiod Estimates
This table reports the abnormal fraction of institutional investors’ equity holdings invested in local
stocks. Excess Local Weight is the percentage of the investor’s portfolio invested in stocks located
in the investor’s state (local stocks) minus the percentage of the “market portfolio” located in the
investor’s state. We take the average of excess weights across all institutions each quarter, and then
report the time-series average of those quarterly averages. The quarterly averaging across institutions
is either weighted equally (first row) or weighted by the total dollar value of the institution’s holdings
at the beginning of the quarter (second row). The sample period is from 1996 to 2008.
Excess Local Portfolio Weight
PREREG POSTREG
1996-1999 2000-2003 2004-2008 2000-2008
Equal-Weighted Average 2.63% 1.75% 1.13% 1.41%
Holdings-Weighted Average 0.97% 0.14% −0.43% −0.17%
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Table 6
Performance of Institutional Investors in Local and Non-Local Stocks:
Subperiod Estimates
This table reports the average performance of institutional investors’ local and non-local holdings and
trading, for different subperiods of our sample. For each institution with non-zero portfolio weight
in local stocks, we calculate the monthly characteristics-adjusted returns of its non-local portfolio,
as well as the performance differential between the local and non-local sub-portfolios. We divide
each institutional investor’s quarterly portfolio into 3 mutually exclusive categories: Local HQ, Local
ER1−3, and Non-Local. We exclude Local ER stocks in this table. Panel A reports the holdings-based
performance of the non-local portfolio and the performance differential between local HQ portfolio
and the non-local portfolio. Panel B reports the corresponding trading-based performance; trading-
based performance is defined as the difference in monthly returns of the holdings snapshot at the
end of the preceding quarter minus the holdings snapshot at the beginning of the preceding quarter.
We report mean portfolio characteristic-adjusted returns based on Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and
Wermers (1997) method. We compute the average values of the portfolio performance estimates across
all institutions each month, and then report the time-series averages of the monthly averages. The
monthly averaging across institutions is value-weighted by the total dollar value of the institution’s
holdings at the beginning of the quarter (for Panel A) or by the total dollar value of holdings that
experience net change in portfolio position (for Panel B). The non-local (NL) performance is reported
in the first row of each panel, while the differences in performance between local HQ and non-local
are reported in the remaining rows. The t-statistics reported in parentheses below the Non Local
performance estimates (i.e., the first row in each panel) are for the null hypothesis of zero Non-Local
performance. The t-statistics below the performance differential estimates between the local HQ and
non-local stocks are for the null hypothesis of no difference in mean performance across local HQ and
non-local institutional sub-portfolios. Both types of t-statistics are adjusted for autocorrelation and
heteroscedasticity following Newey-West (1987).
Panel A: Holding Performance
PREREG POSTREG
Sample Period: All 1996–1999 2000–2003 2004–2008
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Non-Local (NL) 0.096 0.113 0.165 0.027
(t-stat) (1.11) (1.40) (1.67) (0.18)
Differences in Performance between Local and Non-Local
Local HQ minus NL −0.004 0.129 −0.062 −0.065
(t-stat vs. NL) (−0.03) (1.06) (−0.42) (−0.58)
Panel B: Trading Performance
PREREG POSTREG
Sample Period: All 1996–1999 2000–2003 2004–2008
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Non-Local (NL) 0.076 0.148 0.064 0.028
(t-stat) (1.57) (1.78) (0.88) (0.39)
Differences in Performance between Local and Non-Local
Local HQ minus NL 0.017 0.154 0.000 −0.079
(t-stat vs. NL) (0.44) (1.87) (0.01) (−0.49)
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Table 7
Local Analyst Coverage Regression Estimates
This table reports the estimates from local coverage regressions of sell-side equity analysts. The de-
pendent variable is the excess coverage of local stocks, which is the difference between the fraction of
local stocks in an analyst’s stock coverage portfolio and the fraction of local stocks that the analyst can
potentially cover within the CRSP universe. In the first two columns, we use equal-weighted fractions,
while in the last two columns, we use value-weighted fractions. The independent variables include in-
dicator variable for POSTREG (2000 onward), analyst characteristics (tenure, past performance, and
number of firms covered), and an indicator variable for analysts employed by prestigious brokerage
houses. All specifications include state fixed effects. The definitions of all variables are provided in the
Appendix. Following Petersen (2009), the t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on standard
errors clustered by year and state. The sample period is from 1996 to 2008.
Dependent Variable: Excess Coverage of Local Stocks (in %)
Equal-Weighted Value-Weighted
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
POSTREG −3.48 −4.76 −3.07 −4.48
(−5.23) (−6.25) (−4.91) (−6.84)
PBROKER −1.62 −4.14 −1.25 −4.02
(−2.59) (−4.20) (−1.8) (−5.28)
PBROKER × POSTREG 3.77 4.14
(3.70) (3.98)
HIGHPERF 0.09 0.10 0.9 0.92
(0.10) (0.11) (0.91) (0.93)
TENURE −0.06 −0.06 0.11 0.12
(−0.3) (−0.27) (0.37) (0.4)
NFCOVER −0.18 −0.18 −0.15 −0.15
(−5.41) (−5.46) (−4.27) (−4.31)
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 23, 518 23, 518 23, 516 23, 516
Adj. R2 0.205 0.206 0.231 0.232
Mean of Excess Coverage 9.61 9.61 6.28 6.28
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Table 8
Local Forecast Accuracy Regression Estimates
This table reports the estimates from forecast accuracy and market reaction regressions. The dependent
variable is one of the measures of analyst quarterly earnings forecast error. The independent variables
include an indicator variable LOCAL and its interaction with POSTREG (2000 onward). LOCAL
is set to one if the analyst and the firm headquarters are in the same state. We do not include the
stand-alone regime variables since they are subsumed by the time-varying analyst fixed effects. The
definitions of all variables are provided in the Appendix. Following Petersen (2009), the t-statistics
reported in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered by firm and quarter. The sample period
is from 1996 to 2008.
Dependent Variable: Forecast Error
Dep. Var.: ERRMDN ERRPCTL DAFE
Sample Period: Full Full Full PREREG POSTREG
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
LOCAL 0.92 −0.35 −0.44 −0.44 −0.02
(2.67) (−2.47) (−1.65) (−1.65) (−0.10)
LOCAL × POSTREG −1.06 0.22 0.42
(−2.46) (1.20) (1.32)
Analyst × Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 811,669 811,669 786,605 276,729 509,876
Adj. R2 0.156 0.164 0.121 0.103 0.149
P -value
(LOCAL+LOCAL×POSTREG) 0.628 0.303 0.918
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Table 9
Local Ownership and Informed Trading:
Estimates From Constant and Time-Varying Coefficients Specifications
This table reports pooled cross-sectional regression coefficient estimates and corresponding t-statistics
for the relation between firm-level measures of informed trading in the year following the fiscal year
end and the level of excess local institutional ownership as of the fiscal year end. In Panels B and
C this relation is conditioned on the regulatory regime. We also control for time-varying firm and
state characteristics and include year as well as state fixed effects. POSTREG is an indicator variable
equal to one for fiscal years ending in calendar years 2000 and onward. We interact this indicator
variable with LOCOWN, but do not include the standalone variable since it is subsumed by the year
fixed effects. Among the dependent variables, PIN is the probability of private information related
trade from Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2002) model. ADJPIN and PSOS are PIN’s components
from Duarte and Young (2009). ADJPIN is the probability of private information related trade from
the extended model in Duarte and Young (2009), while PSOS is the probability that a given trade
happens during a symmetric order flow shock. Effective Spread (SPREAD) is the difference between
the actual execution price and the midpoint of market quotes. We provide separate measurements
of the spread around earnings announcements (SPDEARN) and excluding earnings announcements
(SPDOTH). The definitions of all variables are provided in the Appendix. Following Petersen (2009),
the t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered by year and state. The
sample is restricted to 1996 to 2004 period due to the availability of PIN components.
43
Panel A: Estimates Using Constant Coefficients Specifications
Dependent Variable: Subsequent Year PIN or Spread (in %)
PIN-Based Spreads-Based
PIN ADJPIN PSOS SPREAD SPDOTH SPDEARN
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LOCOWN 4.267 2.337 6.122 0.351 0.348 0.385
(9.45) (5.28) (11.90) (10.65) (10.58) (8.45)
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 12,356 12,356 12,356 35,507 35,507 35,507
Adj. R2 0.480 0.492 0.318 0.524 0.523 0.474
Panel B: Estimates Using Time-Varying Coefficients Specifications
Dependent Variable: Subsequent Year PIN or Spread (in %)
PIN-Based Spreads-Based
PIN ADJPIN PSOS SPREAD SPDOTH SPDEARN
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LOCOWN 4.258 2.442 4.621 0.466 0.466 0.463
(8.44) (5.47) (6.70) (8.07) (8.43) (4.57)
LOCOWN × POSTREG 0.019 −0.923 2.894 −0.173 −0.177 −0.118
(0.02) (−1.19) (2.23) (−3.33) (−3.57) (−1.22)
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 12,356 12,356 12,356 35,507 35,507 35,507
Adj. R2 0.480 0.513 0.319 0.525 0.524 0.474
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Panel C: Estimates Using Time-Varying Coefficients Specifications Around Earnings Announcements
Dependent Variable: Spread Around Earnings Announcement (in %)
Pre-Announcement Post-Announcement
(−5:−1) (−10:−1) (−20:−1) (+1:+5) (+1:+10) (+1:+20)
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LOCOWN 0.310 0.310 0.295 0.308 0.310 0.299
(6.27) (6.32) (6.06) (6.05) (6.35) (6.29)
LOCOWN × POSTREG −0.156 −0.138 −0.143 −0.048 −0.055 −0.058
(−1.86) (−1.69) (−1.75) (−0.52) (−0.62) (−0.67)
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 41,001 41,007 41,009 41,055 41,059 41,060
Adj. R2 0.412 0.437 0.453 0.432 0.454 0.462
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Appendix: Variable Definitions
Ownership, Concentration, and Performance Measures
HQ State is the U.S. state or the District of Columbia in which the firm headquarters are
located. HQ Excess Ownership (LOCOWN) is the state institutional ownership of a firm’s
HQ state minus that state’s average institutional ownership. State Ownership is the state’s
institutional investors’ share in the total institutional ownership. Ownership Herfindahl is the
Herfindahl-Hirschman concentration index (HHI) of state-level institutional ownership across all
U.S. states. Ownership GCI is the concentration of state-level institutional ownership across
all U.S. states adjusted for the “natural” level of ownership concentration resulting from the
geographical clustering of institutional investors. Institutional ownership (IO) in a firm is the
total number of shares owned by all 13(f) institutions as a proportion of the total number of
shares outstanding for the firm.
Information Environment Variables
Turnover (TURN) is trading volume divided by shares outstanding. Idiosyncratic Volatility
(IVOL) and Idiosyncratic Skewness (ISKEW) are calculated from residuals of annual market-
model regressions of monthly stock returns. Major Auditor (MAJAUD) is an indicator variable
equal to one if the firm hires a major auditor (AU code 01 to 08 in Compustat) in the relevant
fiscal year. Analyst Coverage (ANCOV) is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm is fol-
lowed by at least one equity analyst during the relevant fiscal year according to IBES records.
Number of Analysts (NUMANA) is the number of unique equity analysts providing earnings
forecasts or recommendations for the company stock during the relevant fiscal year. Absolute
Discretionary Accruals (ABSDACC) is the absolute value of the residual from the modified
Jones model of discretionary accruals estimated separately for each year/two-digit SIC code
combination, following Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1995). Local Analyst Coverage (LOCAN-
COV) is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm is followed by at least one equity analyst
located in the firm’s HQ state during the relevant fiscal year. LOCAL is a dummy variable that
is set to one if the firm headquarters and the analyst are located in the same state and, zero
otherwise. It is defined in an analogous manner for economically relevant states.
Other Firm Characteristics and Local Attributes
Log(Market Cap) (MCAP) is the stock price multiplied by the number of shares outstanding.
Book-to-Market (BM) is the ratio of book and market equity. Financial Leverage (FINLEV)
is defined as (Total Long Term Debt + Preferred Equity Liquidation Value)/(Market Value of
Equity at Fiscal Year End + Total Long Term Debt + Preferred Equity Liquidation Value).
46
Firm Age (AGE) is the number of years since a firm’s first appearance in the CRSP database
(i.e., since it becomes a publicly traded firm). 6m Lagged Return (RET6M) is the raw stock
return in the six months leading up to the beginning of the institutional ownership measurement
quarter. Stock Price (PRICE) is the stock price at the beginning of the institutional ownership
measurement quarter. Following Kumar (2009), Lottery-Type Stock (LOTT) is an indicator
variable for firms that are not in the bottom third of volatility, the bottom third of skewness,
or the top third of price. Among the local attributes, Education (EDU) is the fraction of
college graduates in the state. Population Density (POPDEN) is the state’s population divided
by its land area. Catholic-Protestant Ratio (CPRATIO) is the ratio of Catholic adherents to
Protestant adherents in the state. Religiosity (REL) is the fraction of religious adherents in the
state. Republican (REPUB) is the percentage of the state’s registered voters that voted for the
presidential candidate from the Republican party in the last election.
Microstructure Variables
PIN is the probability of private information related trade from Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara
(2002) model. ADJPIN and PSOS are PIN’s components from Duarte and Young (2009).
ADJPIN is the probability of private information related trade from the extended model in
Duarte and Young (2009), while PSOS is the probability that a given trade happens during a
symmetric order flow shock. Effective Spread (SPREAD) is the difference between the actual
execution price and the midpoint of market quotes. We measure the spread in the [−1:+1]
window around earnings announcements (SPDEARN) and excluding earnings announcements
(SPDOTH).
Analyst-Related Measures
High Performance (HIGHPERF) is the fraction of analyst forecasts in the past year with below-
median forecast errors. Tenure (TENURE) is the number of quarters since the analyst’s first
appearance in the I/B/E/S dataset. Prestigious Broker (PBROKER) is an indicator variable
that takes the value of one if the analyst is employed by a prestigious brokerage house. Number
of Firms Covered (NFCOVER) is the number of stocks covered by the analyst in a particular
quarter. The excess coverage of local stocks (EXCOVLOC) is the difference between the fraction
of local stocks in an analyst’s stock coverage portfolio and the fraction of local stocks that the
analyst can potentially cover within the CRSP universe. Equal-weighted excess local coverage
is defined as the number of covered local stocks divided by the number of all covered stocks
minus the number of available local stocks divided by the number of all stocks. Value-weighted
excess local coverage is defined as the total market capitalization of covered local stocks divided
by the total market capitalization of all covered stocks minus the total market capitalization
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of all local stocks divided by the total market capitalization of all stocks. Error Below Median
(ERRMDN) is an indicator variable that is set to one if the analyst forecast error is below
the median forecast error of all analyst forecasts for the same firm-quarter. Error Percentile
(ERRPCTL) is the percentile ranking of a given analyst forecast error within the universe of
all forecasts for the same firm-quarter. Following Malloy (2005), demeaned absolute forecast
error (DAFE) is calculated as the absolute forecast error (AFE) for an analyst’s forecast of
a particular firm’s annual earnings minus the mean absolute forecast error for that earnings
report. Absolute forecast error is calculated as the absolute value of an analyst’s latest forecast,
minus the actual earnings, as a percentage of the stock price one-year prior to the beginning of
the fiscal year.
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